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COMMENTS
MENNONITE BOARD OF MISSIONS V. ADAMS:
EXPANSION OF THE DUE PROCESS
NOTICE REQUIREMENT
"For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due
process has been clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are
entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they
must first be notified."" Traditionally, the property interests protected
by the procedural due process limitations referred to above were those
derived from the peaceful possession or use of real or personal property. 2
The courts adopted a rights-privilege distinction in which procedural due
process safeguards did not apply if there was no traditionally recognized
property interest in the thing of which one was deprived.' In the early
1970's the Supreme Court recognized an "entitlement" interest wherein
deprivations of "privileges" are protected if the party affected is deemed
entitled to them. 4 The courts look to applicable federal, state, or local
law to define the interest,5 rather than to traditional common law
concepts of rights in property. Thus, rights previously not recognized
as protected by procedural due process will be protected if they are
secured by law, i.e., not subject to removal at the government's dis-
cretion, 6 and not limited by statute.
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1994 (1972) (quoting Baldwin
v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863)).
2. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 10-8, at 509 (1978). See Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 92 S. Ct. 862 (1972) (tenant occupancy); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972) (possession of household items purchased on credit);
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950)
(interests of beneficiaries in a common trust); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)
(possession of land).
3. See Cafateria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 81 S. Ct. 1743 (1961).
4. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2708-10 (1972).
5. Id. at 577, 92 S. Ct. at 2709. See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct.
1586 (1978).
6. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976); L. Tribe, supra note
2, § 10-10, at 524.
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Once the court identifies a property interest as protected, procedural
due process requires that the party affected be afforded notice of the
proceedings. 7 Generally notice must be by means "reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the
pendency of the action, and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections." 8 Furthermore, notice must be at a time when the deprivation
can still' be prevented.9
The "reasonably calculated" rule of Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Company is not as clear as it seems when one considers
the pre-Mullane history of procedural due process. Initially, different
forms of notice were afforded to residents and non-residents, based
primarily on the distinction between in rem and in personam actions.
Because jurisdiction was based on the state's power over the person (in
personam) or Over the thing (in rem), the state had no right to serve
process on a non-resident outside its state boundaries. Therefore, con-
structiv'e notice was the only means available to notify non-residents of
actions against their property in the state.' 0 Although constructive notice
in in rem actions was used for jurisdictional reasons, the true test for
adequate notice under the due process clause for both in rem and in
personam actions was based on the totality of circumstances or a bal-
ancing of interests. Mullane recognized this distinction between the ju-
risdiction and notice requirements of due process. 2
Mullane maintained that the in rem-in personam distinction was
ancient and that Fourteenth Amendment requirements do not depend
upon such classifications.' 3 Relying on Mullane, the Supreme Court in
Shaffer v. Heitner recognized that an action in rem is merely an indirect
action in personam, and held that the same test for determining juris-
diction in personam would apply to actions in rem.' 4 It is important to
note that Mullane was primarily a notice case and that while the dicta
in Mullane was made law in Shaffer, Shaffer did not hold that the
same form of notice should be used for both in rem and in personam
actions. Mullane dictated that reference must be made to "the subject
with which the statute deals,"' 5 that "all the circumstances"'16 must be
7. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S. Ct. at 657.
8. Id.
9. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 82, 92 S. Ct. at 1995.
10. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 426 U.S. 791, 796 n.3, 103 S. Ct. 2706,
2710 n.3 (1983).
11. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14, 70 S. Ct. at 657.
12. Id. at 313, 70 S. Ct. at 656-57.
13. Id. at 312, 70 S. Ct. at 656.
14. 433 U.S. 186, 206-07, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2580-81 (1977).
15. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 70 S. Ct. at 657 (quoting American Land Co. v. Zeiss,
219 U.S. 47, 67, 31 S. Ct. 200, 204 (1911)).
16. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S. Ct. at 657.
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considered and that the interests of the individual and the state must
be balanced.' 7 This balancing test Was applied notwithstanding the clas-
sification of the action as in rem or in personam.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court rendered another opinion
that relies heavily on Mullane. In Mennonite Board of Missions V'.
Adams, the Court held thit 'if a proceeding will' adversely affect any
party's interests, and if the party's name'and address are "reasonably
ascertainable," notice by mail or other means equally 'certain to actually
notify is a "minimum constitutional precondition." This notice is re-
quired regardless of the party's commercial sophistication. 8 Thi's holding
departs from the established principles of law outlined above in several
respects and may have very serious ramifications' in many areas of
procedural law. This comment analyzes Mennonite and considers its
application to provisions of Louisiana law for governmental deprivations
of private property.
The Indiana tax statutes considered in Mennonite allowed the sale
of property on which the taxes had been delinquent for a minimum of
fifteen months. 9 The statute provided notice to the property owner by
certified mail or personal service at his last known address.2 0 All other
persons were relegated to notice posted in the county courthouse and
published weekly for a three-week period. 2' After a tax sale, the owner,
occupant, lienholder or any other person with an interest in the property
could redeem the property within two years of the sale.2 2 Prior to the
expiration of the redemptive period, the tax purchaser's property right
was limited to a lien superior to all others existing at the time of
purchase. 23 If the property was not redeemed within the two year period
the tax purchaser could file an application for a deed. 24 The county
auditor, before executing the deed, had to notify the former owner of
his redemptive rights, and if the owner did not exercise these rights
within thirty days the deed was issued.2 " By virtue of this deed, the
taxpayer acquired "an estate in fee simple, absolute, free and clear of
all liens and encumbrances. 2 6 The statute did not require notice to a
mortgagee of its redemptive rights prior to the execution of the deed.
17. Id.
18. 462 U.S. at 799-800, 103 S. Ct. at 2712.
19. Ind. Code Ann. § 6-1.1-24-1 (Burns 1984).
20. Ind. Code Ann. § 6-1.1-24-4 (Burns 1984).
21. Ind. Code Ann. § 6-1.1-24-3 (Burns 1984).
22. Ind. Code Ann. §§ 6-1.1-25-1, 6-1.1-25-4 (Burns 1984).
23. Ind. Code Ann. § 6-1.1-24-9(b) (Burns 1984).
24. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 794, 103 S. Ct, at 2709; see Ind. Code Ann. § 6-1.1-
25-4 (Burns 1984).
25. Ind. Code Ann. § 6-1.1-25-6 (Burns 1984).
26. Ind. Code Ann. § 6-1.1-25-4(d) (Burns 1984).
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In Mennonite the state, in a 1977 tax sale, sold property upon which
the Mennonite Board of Missions (MBM) held a mortgage. MBM as
mortgagee was not notified that a tax sale had occurred because, under
the statute, they were not considered owners of the property.27 Moreover,
because the mortgagor continued to make the monthly payments MBM
was not informed of the sale until after the two year redemptive period
had expired when Adams, the tax purchaser, filed suit seeking to quiet
title to the property. MBM claimed that the tax sale was invalid because
they had not received adequate notice as required by the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution. The Court specifically held: "When the
mortgagee is identified in a mortgage tht is publicly recorded, con-
structive notice by publication must be supplemented by notice mailed
to the mortgagee's last known available address. '2 As noted above,
mailed notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding
which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party. 9
In addition to the notice rule, the Court drew three conclusions:
1. Notice to the property owner, not in privity with his creditor,
is not reasonably calculated to lead to actual notice to the
mortgagee.30
2. A mortgagee's knowledge of tax delinquency is not equiv-
alent to notice that a tax sale is pending.3
3. A party's ability to safeguard its interests does not relieve
the state of its constitutional obligation to send notice.3 2
The Court based its holding on the analysis in Mullane, determining
that because the mortgagee had a substantial property interest signifi-
cantly affected by the tax sale, it was entitled to Mullane notice.3 Justice
Marshall, writing for the majority, reasoned that since a mortgagee
identified in the public records was reasonably ascertainable,3 4 merely
mailing in notice to the property owner was not sufficient, as it was
not expected to lead to actual notice to the mortgagee." Under Mullane,
one "desirous of actually informing ' 36 would not expect that notice
mailed to the mortgagor would inform the mortgagee. The Court com-
pared the Mullane beneficiaries to the mortgagee in Mennonite: "The
27. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 793, 794 nn. 1-2, 103 S. Ct. at 2708, 2709 nn.I-2.
28. Id. at 798, 103 S. Ct. 2711.
29. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
30. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 799, 103 S. Ct. at 2711.
31. Id. at 800, 103 S. Ct. at 2712.
32. Id. at 799, 103 S. Ct. at 2712.
33. Id. at 798, 103 S. Ct. at 2711.
34. Id. at 798 n.4, 103 S. Ct. at 2711 n.4.
35. Id. at 799, 103 S. Ct. at 2711.
36. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 70 S. Ct. at 657.
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chance of actual notice is further reduced when, as here, the notice
required does not even name those whose attention it is supposed to
attract. ' 37 However, the beneficiaries in Mullane had an ownership
interest in the proceeds of the trust, while MBM had only a privilege
over the seized property. Because the property interests involved are
different, it is reasonable that MBM should be relegated to general
constructive notice along with other creditors although beneficiaries in
a trust should receive notice specifically directed at them. Therefore,
Justice Marshall's comparison falls. Nevertheless, the court required that
notice be mailed to the mortgagee, viewing the notice by mail requirement
as a "relatively modest administrative burden, ' 3 8 and stating that the
party's ability to safeguard its interests does not relieve the state of its
constitutional obligation to provide notice.
A dissenting opinion, authored by Justice O'Connor, did not view
the burden as a modest one. It criticized the majority for requiring
reasonable efforts without providing clear guidelines for deciding how'
far the state must go to ascertain the name and address of an affected
party,3 9 and preferred a balancing approach using a due process analysis
rather than the inflexible rule adopted by the majority. Moreover, Justice
O'Connor interpreted Mullane quite differently. She pointed out that
Mullane espoused the balancing approach and that the Mullane majority
expressly limited its holding to the "practicalities and peculiarities of
the case." ' 40 Because a balancing approach is the proper analysis for
procedural due process, the dissent argued, a party's ability to safeguard
its interests is a factor in determining notice requirements. In fact, Justice
O'Connor postulated that the constitutional obligation of the state may
be defined by the party's ability to protect its interests. 4' Therefore,
because the vast majority of mortgagees can and do take precautions
against tax sales, the state should not be unduly burdened. The dissent
further recognized that the justification for allowing constructive notice,
instead of actual notice, was not the in rem-in personam distinction, as
maintained by the majority, but the obligation, imposed by the mort-
gagee's property interest, to act reasonably in keeping informed of
proceedings affecting it.42 "Mullane expressly acknowledged, and did
not reject, the continued vitality of the notion that property owners had
some burden to protect their property. 49 3
37. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 795-96, 103 S. Ct. at 2709-10 (quoting Mullane, 339
U.S. at 315, 70 S. Ct. at 658).
38. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 800, 103 S. Ct. at 2712.
39. Id. at 799, 103 S. Ct. at 2715.
40. Id. at 805, 103 S. Ct. at 2713 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S. Ct. at
657).
41. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 803, 103 S. Ct. at 2713-14.
42. Id. at 804, 103 S. Ct. at 2714.
43. Id., 103 S. Ct. at 2714.
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The dissent'.s balancing approach, is preferable to the majority's
inflexible rule, not only because it generates more equitable results, but
also because it is in accordance with established notions of protected
property interests as defined by federal, state, or local law. Although
a mortgage interest is hard to classify as belonging to any of the property
interest classifications discussed above, one cannot deny that it is a real
right that attaches to property." In Mennonite the Indiana statute sub-
ordinated the mortgage interest to the purchaser's lien interest and
ultimately nullified the mortgage. The majority held that the loss of the
privilege over the mortgaged property was a deprivation of property.
However, because this real right of mortgage arises from a contract, it
is logical to consider the mortgagee's expectations regarding possible
state action against his interests. The mortgagee enters the contract
knowing that, he has no ownership interest. He realizes that his real
right over the property is created by law and is exigible only in the
event of default on the debt secured by the mortgage. Therefore, a
mortgagee, aware of the limitations placed on his rights, expects that
he must affirmatively safeguard his interests.
A..balancing. approach would allow for consideration of these ex-
pectations. The Mennonite Court, though purporting to rely on Mullane,
ignored the balancing. approach used in that decision. Justice Marshall's
opinion considered only the interests of the party adversely affected and
cursorily labelled the burden on the state as "relatively modest." The
Court's rejection of the balancing approach may be based partly on its
erroneous conclusion that-Mullane's rejection of the in rem-in personam
distinction mandated a strict rule regarding notice for in rem and in
personam actions without -reference to the interests involved.4 However,
Mullane distinguished the jurisdictional issue from the notice issue. 46
The effect of Mennonite's. departure from prior due process analysis
can be seen through an analysis of its implications for Louisiana pro-
cedural law.47
44. La. Civ. Code art. 3282.
45. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 796 n.3, 103 S. Ct. at 2710 n.3.
46. "Quite different from the question of a state's power to discharge trustees is
that of the opportunity it must give beneficiaries to contest." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313,
70 S. Ct. at 656.
47. Non-final deprivations such as attachment and sequestration do not fall within
the scope of the Mennonite decision. The Mennonite holding contemplates that the party
will be adversely affected by the proceeding, i.e., tax sale, before there is notice and
opportunity for a hearing. In attachment and sequestration, the property is seized only
while an ultimate judicial determination of the matter is pending. See La. Code Civ. P.
arts. 3541, 3571. There will be no sale until after the judicial hearing, of which the party
is notified. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3510. Louisiana sequestration procedures were upheld
by the United States Supreme Court against a procedural due process attack in Mitchell
v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
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TAX SALES AND MORTGAGEES
Mennonite directly applies to tax sales of immovables as they affect
mortgagees of record. 4 Louisiana law requires notice of delinquency to
the assessed taxpayer, the record owner, or the actual owner (if.. the
record owner is deceased) by mail or personal service on January 2 of
each year, or as soon as possible thereafter. 49 This notice ;informs the
owner that if the taxes are not paid within twenty days, his property
will be sold according to law.5 0 If the owner does not pay the taxes
within the twenty day grace period, which is calculated from the date
of the mailing of the last delinquency notice, the tax collector advertises
the property for sale.5 The tax purchaser receives a deed which states
that the property is redeemable within three years from the date. the
deed is filed in the records of the parish where the property is situated,
and if the property is not redeemed within the three year redemption
period, all conventional and judicial mortgages are cancelled .52
The most significant difference between the Indiana procedure and
the Louisiana procedure, is that in Indiana, upon sale, the tax purchaser
does not receive a deed to the land but only a lien interest superior to
all other existing mortgages. 3 Therefore, the mortgagee's interests are
adversely affected immediately upon completion of the sale, whereas in
Louisiana the purchaser receives a deed to the land without any. im-
mediate effect upon the existing mortgages. Although the tax sale does
not divest the mortgagee of his mortgage, it does impose certain burdens
on him to maintain that interest. Either the mortgagee or the debtor-
mortgagor must redeem the property, or the mortgagee will lose his
48. Mortgagees not of record would not fall under the holding of Mennonite for
two reasons: (1) They are not reasonably ascertainable because their existence is not a
matter of record. Mennonite requires reasonably diligent efforts and implies that reason-
ableness is measured by availability in the public records. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798
n.4, 103 S.Ct. at 2711 n.4. (2) The state should be able to rely on the law of registry.
The unrecorded mortgage is not effective against the state, and therefore, the mortgagee
who has not recorded his mortgage has no property right to assert against the state.
The Mennonite rule is not applicable to seizures of movables as they affect other
interested parties, particularly transferees. Because sales of movables are generally not
recorded, the transfer is not effective against third parties, unless the movable has already
been delivered, in which case it is not subject to seizure and the transferee cannot be
adversely affected. Before delivery the state may rely on the presumption of ownership
in the debtor/possessor. Furthermore, in tax sales, the state may seize other movables in
satisfaction of the delinquent taxes. See La. Civ. Code arts. 518, 530; La. R.S. 47:1577,
2175 (1970 & Supp. 1985); Rosenthal v. Floor Coverings, Inc., 73 So. 2d 39 (La. App.
Orl. 1954).
49. La. R.S. 47:2180(A) (Supp. 1985).
50, Id-
51. La. R.S. 47:2181 (Supp. 1985).
52. La. R.S. 47:2183 (1952).
53. Ind. Code Ann. § 6-1.1-24-9(b) (Burns 1984).
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mortgage upon expiration of the redemptive period. To redeem the
property, the mortgagee must pay all assessed taxes with interest, possible
penalties and costs, plus reimbursements for improvements made by the
tax purchaser . 4 Reading Mennonite literally, there is a strong argument
that this procedure violates due process because the mortgagee, an
interested party adversely affected by the tax sale, is not afforded
Mullane notice. The mortgagee's interests definitely are adversely af-
fected, i.e., divested, upon cancellation after the redemptive period has
expired with no attempt to redeem.
In Louisiana, as in Indiana, the mortgagee does not automatically
receive mailed notice of the tax sale or of his redemptive rights. The
tax sale procedures of both states relegate the mortgagee and other
"interested" parties to notice by publication. Under Mennonite, the
Indiana and Louisiana procedures both violate due process in that,
though they provide Mullane notice to the owner of the assessed property
before he is adversely affected, they do not provide similar notice to
mortgagees.
However, under the rationale of Mullane both procedures would
probably be valid. Mullane did not mandate that notice reasonably
calculated to inform be afforded to all who are reasonably ascertainable,
regardless of the nature of the interest they possess. In fact, the property
interest involved in Mullane was a very important factor in the Court's
determination of the case. The claimants were beneficiaries of a trust,
and all had an identical interest in the proper management of the trust.
The ascertainable-nonascertainable distinction was fair because those ac-
tually notified could act on behalf of those who received only constructive
notice." But, in Mennonite, the ascertainable-nonascertainable distinction
was extended and applied to mortgagees. Notice to some does not protect
the interests of all. Therefore, relegating one mortgagee to constructive
notice merely because his address is not reasonably ascertainable, while
affording another with notice by mail is not fair. One should consider
the property interest involved to determine the form of notice applicable
and afford that same notice to all within that class. In most cases a
balancing of the interests of both parties should precede a determination
that Mullane notice is warranted, and then it should be afforded if the
party is reasonably ascertainable. Justice Marshall sidestepped the initial
balancing analysis and concluded that since there was a property interest
at stake, Mullane notice was required. Therefore, Mennonite mandates
Mullane notice in all cases, something that Mullane itself did not do.
Mullane balances the cost of the procedure to the state against the
individual interests to be protected. Normally, the cost to the state
54. La. R.S. 47:2222, 2224 (Supp. 1985).
55. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319, 70 S. Ct. at 659-60.
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should not outweigh the individual's property interest. One may argue
that the mortgagee of record should have his property interest protected
by Mullane notice because the cost of checking the records does not
alone justify dispensing with more certain notice and because the state
should be held to the knowledge of a mortgage that has been properly
recorded.
However, although cost alone may not justify a balancing in favor
of the state, perhaps other factors, such as the state's interest in orderly
and efficient tax collections, depending on the property interest at stake,
would shift the balance in the state's favor. As discussed above, a
mortgagee, having no ownership interest, should not reasonably expect
notice by mail of all proceedings against the property. When the mort-
gagee has knowingly acquired a subordinate interest, the cost to the
state becomes more significant than the interests of the mortgagee and
the protections of the public records doctrine. Furthermore, a mortgagee
can pass on the cost of safeguarding his interests to the property owner,
who benefits from the mortgage contract. On the other hand, the state
must pass its cost on to the taxpayers. Though widely dispersed, this
cost is paid by people who have neither an interest in the property nor
receive the benefits of the mortgage contract. One must not forget that
the mortgagee's right is contractual and that his right over the property
is merely an accessory to the debt. On the other hand, the state's interest
is based on the sovereign power of taxation. Therefore, the state's interest
should weigh more heavily in the balancing analysis.
In a balancing approach, one must also consider the practicalities.
For example, the majority in Mennonite ignored the fact that Mullane
did not expect the parties to go beyond their normal business practices.
Notice by mail would not be required if the interested party's identity
was discoverable upon investigation, but not in the due course of busi-
ness. Notice by mail was required, however, if the names and post
office addresses were "on the books." '5 6 One can argue then, that in a
balancing analysis, one should consider the business practices of the
parties. Businessmen form expectations based on customary business
practices. Many mortgagees routinely require either annual verification
of tax payments or payment of taxes out of escrow accounts. The state
should be able to rely on these customs of the mortgage business. If
Mullane accepted the presumption that owners will protect their property,
today's Court should accept the presumption that mortgagees will mon-
itor the tax status of their mortgaged property.
The rule of Mennonite is most advantageous to the small mortgagee
or owner-financier who, because he is not in the mortgage business,
lacks the means, expertise, and sophistication needed to protect his
56. Id. at 318, 70 S. Ct. at 659.
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interests. However, placing the burden on the state to notify all mort-
gagees for the benefit of a few unsophisticates is an inequitable balancing
of interests and is contrary to the business custom which places the
burden of protecting his mortgage interest upon the mortgagee. The
only possible justification for a balancing in favor of mortgagees and
requiring mailed notice is the recent increase in owner-financing and
other new, creative financing techniques. However, even with this in-
crease, owner-financing is rare.57
Despite the obvious merits of balancing, Mennonite rejects this
approach and places the constitutional burden on the state. However,
there may be a way that the state can ease the burden and also comply
with Mennonite. The Indiana Legislature amended its statute to provide
for notice to mortgagees who annually request it and who agree to pay
a fee to cover the cost of that notice.5" The Court did not decide the
constitutionality of this amendment. In 1984, the Louisiana Legislature
enacted a similar statute which provides that the holder of a recorded
mortgage will receive the same notice of delinquency afforded to owners
if he notifies the tax collector of the mortgage and pays a five-dollar
fee.5 9 The Mennonite majority would probably find that the Indiana
approach is a denial of due process because the party's ability to
safeguard its interests does not relieve the state of its constitutional
obligation to send notice. This rule is contrary to the Court's own
reasoning on the issue of ascertainability. The Court implied that a
mortgagee is per se ascertainable if the mortgage is recorded. One may
reason from that premise that the mortgagee not of record is not
ascertainable. Under the rubric of nonascertainability, the Court does
not impose the duty of providing Mullane notice on the state even
though the mortgagee has the ability to protect his interests by recor-
dation. Therefore, Mennonite implicitly recognized that the state can
impose a duty to safeguard one's interests before Mullane notice is
warranted. This legislation, like our recordation laws, constitutes a sta-
tutory duty to safeguard one's interests.
Moreover, the entitlement principle of property rights maintains that
property rights are defined and created by the state. For example, the
state need not recognize an unrecorded mortgage. If the state is not
required to recognize that property right, it is as if it does not exist.
The state has defined that right to be effective against third parties only
if recorded. By analogy, a mortgagee who does not request notice under
the new statute, like a mortgagee who does not record his mortgage,
57. See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 808, 103 S. Ct. at 2716 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 793 n.2, 103 S. Ct. at 2708 n.2; Ind. Code Ann. § 6-1.1-24-4.2 (Burns
1984).
59. La. R.S. 47:2180.1 (Supp. 1985).
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may be ignored by the state because his property interest is treated as
if it does not exist. The state has defined the property rights of mort-
gagees in relation to the tax collector to require a request for notification
to be effective, just as it has defined their property rights in relation
to third parties generally to require recordation to be effective. At the
very least, the statute acts as an exception to the general protections of
the public records doctrine, and the state is free to define these pro-
tections.
In summary, Mennonite departs from established notions of pro-
tected property interests and the balancing approach to due process
problems. Furthermore, the Court erred when it relied on the rejection
of the in rem-in personam distinction to analyze the notice requirement
of due process and contradicted itself when it implicitly equated lack
of recordation with non-ascertainability (no entitlement to Mullane no-
tice), but stated that the mortgagee need not take steps to protect himself
to be entitled to Mullane notice. Nevertheless, the rule laid out by
Justice Marshall is now the law, and Louisiana tax sale provisions are
sufficiently similar to those of Indiana that one can argue quite
convincingly that they do not meet due process requirements under a
literal reading of Mennonite. However, the recent enactment of legislation
affording notice to mortgagees of immovables upon request should rem-
edy any deficiency of Louisiana procedure in light of Mennonite.
TAX SALES AND TRANSFEREES
The logical extension of the Mennonite's "any party" classification
is to transferees. Transferees undoubtedly have a significant property
interest at stake. In fact, the property interest involved is even greater
than that vested in mortgagees because transferees actually own the
property, while mortgagees do not.6° The tax collector can seize im-
movable property assessed for taxes to satisfy a tax debt regardless of
ownership, and the property may be seized regardless of whether the
transfer is recorded. 6' Because a transferee has a property interest that
will be adversely affected, he should fall under the Mennonite rule.
Recently, the holding of Mennonite was applied to a transferee of
immovable property. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, relying
on Mennonite, held that, in tax sales, notice of the sale should be sent
to the current owner or transferee as well as to the assessed taxpayer. 62
New Hampshire procedure provided for a tax bill to be forwarded in
November to the record owner as of April of the same year. The
60. La. Civ. Code art. 3278 defines mortgage as the right to have the property seized
and sold as security for a debt. No ownership interest is afforded the mortgagee.
61. La. R.S. 47:2178 (1952).
62. White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 74-75, 470 A.2d 849, 852-53 (1983).
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property at issue was sold in June of the following year without any
notice of the tax arrearages, tax sale, or redemptive rights to transferees
acquiring the property from the assessed tax debtor after April of the
tax year. 63 Reasoning that the current owners were interested parties
whose names and addresses were reasonably ascertainable in the public
records, the court concluded that the transferees were entitled to notice
of the impending tax sale by registered mail. 64 Monitoring all transfers
between the first day of the new tax year (April 1) and the date of
mailing of tax bills (November) was considered too great a burden on
a municipality. 65 Because the names of new owners become available
upon the next year's inventory, and because the sale, not the tax de-
linquency, is the act adversely affecting the owners' interests, 66 notice
at any time prior to the sale (June of the following year) is sufficient.
Due process does not require actual notice to the owners of newly
acquired property at every stage of the proceedings. 67 Louisiana procedure
provides no notice of a pending tax sale to transferees acquiring after
the notice of delinquency.
Even before Mennonite, Louisiana law provided that newly acquired
property owners were not to be prejudiced by their transferor's delin-
quency. Our courts have consistently interpreted the notice of delinquency
statute to require that the notice of delinquency be served on the record
owner at the time of service on the delinquent taxpayer (if ownership
has changed previously) or on the owner of record at the time of
advertisement and sale of the property (if ownership has changed in the
interim) for the sale to be valid. 68 In Louisiana, a transferee's only
remedy is to sue after the fact to have the sale declared a nullity.
While in Louisiana a sale without notice to the transferee acquiring
in the interim (between notice of the sale and the actual sale) is invalid,
Mennonite goes further in requiring that notice be mailed to or personally
served on "any party" before a proceeding that will adversely affect
his interests. Therefore, this Louisiana procedure is subject to a due
process challenge because it does not expressly provide for mailed notice
before the tax sale to transferees acquiring during the interim between
notice of the delinquency and the actual sale.
Arguably, under Mennonite, if the state must notify a mortgagee
of record, then it must also notify a transferee of record. However, as
63. Id. at 72-73, 470 A.2d at 851.
64. Id. at 75, 470 A.2d at 852.
65. Id. at 76, 470 A.2d at 853.
66. Id. at 76, 470 A.2d at 853-54.
67. Id. at 76, 470 A.2d at 853.
68. Martin v. Serice, 200 La. 556, 8 So. 2d 538 (1942) (relying on La. Const. of
1921 Art. X, sec. II and 1898 La. Acts No. 170 §§ 25, 50, 53 (§ 50 provided one source
for La. R.S. 47:2180)). See also In re LaSalle Realty Co., 171 La. 965, 968-69, 132 So.
516, 517 (1931); Doll v. Montgomery, 58 So. 2d 573, 576 (La. App. Orl. 1952).
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argued earlier, the Court in Mennonite was wrong to reject the balancing
test. Under a balancing analysis there is an even stronger case for giving
the transferee's interests less weight than the mortgagee's interests. Be-
cause mortgage terms typically are for twenty years or more, the mort-
gagee, prior to the Mennonite decision, had to check the tax records
annually to assure that their mortgagors have paid the taxes on their
property, provide for other means of verification, or establish escrow
accounts. These difficulties are in stark contrast with the situation of
the transferee who need check only once to determine whether the taxes
have been paid on property he intends to purchase. Furthermore, most
transferees are protected because they hire lawyers, who, in the course
of a title search, will discover problems such as outstanding taxes.
Moreover, most sales will involve a mortgage, and mortgagees often
require verification that the taxes are paid before granting a mortgage
loan. Only a few transferees will not be protected. One situation in
which protection would not be provided, however, is in a "family deal"
such as that in White v. Lee.69 Although these transferees may possess
the requisite business sense to protect their interests, they may feel there
is no .need to check the tax rolls and choose to rely upon the assurances
of the vendor-family member that the taxes are paid.
As discussed above, the rigid rule adopted in Mennonite requires
that notice be afforded to all parties for the benefit of a few who are
not commercially sophisticated. This rule results in a great burden on
the state and may ultimately adversely affect its ability to collect taxes
efficiently. While this burden to notify mortgagees may be justified when
viewed in light of the recent increase in owner-financing and other new,
creative financing techniques, it is not justified with respect to transferees,
since "family deals" are more than likely on the decline. As the dissent
points out, a rigid rule has no place in due process analysis. Mennonite's
failure to consider a party's commercial sophistication and ability to
safeguard its interests is a departure from Mullane and its balancing
analysis. Mullane accepted that property owners were obligated to safe-
guard their property, and this obligation was a factor in determining
the form of notice required by due process. For example, the Court
recognized that seizure may be a supplement to constructive notice, and
that together they constitute adequate notice70 because while publication
may not actually notify, seizure will. The assumption is that the owner
will be watching his property, and the state "may indulge" in the
assumption. Likewise, it has been traditionally accepted that transferees
will check the tax status of property they are purchasing, and the state
69. White involved a conveyance to a family member. 124 N.H. at 72, 470 A.2d at
850.
70. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316, 70 S. Ct. at 658.
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should be allowed to rely on this custom. Therefore, under a proper
reading of Mullane, the Mennonite rule should not be extended to
transferees acquiring in the interim between the tax delinquency and the
tax sale.
The question remains whether transferees who acquire between the
tax sale and the expiration of the redemptive period fall under the
Mennonite rule. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in White v. Lee,
required that notice be afforded transferees before the sale of the prop-
erty and again before expiration of the redemptive period. 71 Upon ex-
piration of the redemptive period, the purchaser's receipt of the tax
deed adversely affects the transferee. Therefore, to protect the rights of
purchasers acquiring property after a tax sale, the court required that
each tax bill reflect prior tax sales, the amount necessary to redeem,
and the date that the redemptive period expires. 72
This protection would not be required in Louisiana, even under a
literal reading of Mennonite, because a transferee acquiring after the
tax sale in Louisiana is protected by our law of registry. In Louisiana,
a tax purchaser receives a deed to the property, subject to redemption. 73
If he does not record the tax deed, the tax purchaser has no claim
against the transferee because his deed is effective against third parties
only upon recordation. Therefore, a mere tax sale without recordation
does not adversely affect a transferee and notice by mail is not warranted,
even under Mennonite. If the deed is recorded and if the transferee
checks his vendor's title before the sale, he will discover the recorded
tax deed and the problem of notice will not arise. In practice, the matter
should be cleared up before the sale or there will be no sale. On the
other hand, if the transferee purchases without checking his vendor's
title and the tax deed was previously recorded, the public records doctrine
deprives the transferee of any claim to the property and his only recourse
is in warranty against his vendor. Since the transferee never had a valid
property interest to assert, Mennonite could not apply.
In summary, notice to transferees acquiring after the delinquency
notice but before the tax sale is required under the strict rule of Men-
nonite. However, a balancing analysis based on a distinction between
a mortgagee and a transferee creates a more equitable result and is in
keeping, with traditional due process analysis. Before the expiration of
the redemptive period but after the tax sale, the interim transferee will
either not be adversely affected or has no assertable right against the
tax purchaser.
71. White, 124 N.H. at 77, 470 A.2d at 854.
72. Id.
73. La. R.S. 47:2183 (1952).
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EXECUTORY PROCESS AND MORTGAGEES
Mennonite's broad "any adverse proceeding" holding may also affect
other proceedings involving the seizure of property. One such area to
which Mennonite, may be extended is executory process. Executory
process is the procedure used to enforce a mortgage or privilege and
involves the seizure and sale of mortgaged property.7 4 Though the seizure
is upon the request of a private entity, a mortgage holder, it is effectuated
by the state and under color of state law, thereby making Fourteenth
Amendment due process limitations applicable."
Executory process requires neither the issuance of citation nor a
judgment. It is based on an authentic act containing a confession of
judgment evidencing the debt and the privilege or mortgage. 76 In a
confession of judgment, the mortgagor-debtor waives any right to notice
or to an adversary hearing. Since one may waive due process rights,
the procedure is constitutional as to the debtor. 77 However, in light of
Mennonite, Louisiana executory process may not be constitutional as it
affects other interested parties, especially mortgagees and other creditors
with rights over the property. These parties receive no notice by mail
at any stage of the proceedings. Instead, they are relegated to mere
constructive notice. A writ of seizure and sale is issued, upon adequate
proof, at the request of the creditor. The property is then seized and
advertised for sale.
78
According to article 2724 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure,
sales under a writ of seizure and sale are governed by the articles on
sales under the writ of fieri facias (execution of judgments). All such
sales are subject to any superior mortgage, lien, or privilege.7 9 Therefore,
the superior mortgagee does not lose his real right over the seized
property. Further statutory protection is afforded the superior creditors
in that the property may not be sold if the price is not sufficient to
satisfy superior claims.80 If the price is adequate, the purchaser pays
the sheriff the amount in excess of the superior claims,8 ' and pays the
superior creditors the balance of the debts. The superior creditors can
enforce their claims against the purchaser who fails to pay.8 2 Therefore,
Mennonite does not apply to creditors with a mortgage, lien, or privilege
superior to that of the seizing creditor because those superior creditors
74. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2631.
75. Bonner v. B-W Utils., 452 F.Supp. 1295, 1300 (W.D. La. 1978).
76. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2631.
77. D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 92 S. Ct. 775 (1972).
78. See La. Code Civ. P. arts. 2634-2638.
79. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 2335, 2372.
80. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2337.
81. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2374.
82. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2378.
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whose mortgages or privileges have not matured are not adversely af-
fected by the proceeding.
However, inferior creditors are adversely affected by the procedure
if the proceeds of the sale are not sufficient to cover all their interests."3
There is no way of determining before the sale whether the proceeds
will be sufficient. Mennonite, literally read, requires notice if the pro-
ceeding will adversely affect the interested party. One may argue that
if the interests may be adversely affected, Mennonite does not apply to
the procedure. As the dissent pointed out: "The criterion . . . 'is not
the possibility of conceivable injury . ,,"'84 Likewise, the Mullane
Court recognized that the state need not provide more certain notice if
a party's claim was "conjectural or future." 85 By chosing the word
"will" over "may" the court recognized that a due process analysis
does not require the consideration of speculative deprivations.
One may also argue that the inferior creditor has no property right
assertable against the superior creditor. The law governs how the claims
of creditors are ranked. An inferior creditor knowingly enters a contract
which places him in an inferior position relative to other creditors. He
is aware that his rights to the security are limited by law. Furthermore,
he is aware that since he is an inferior creditor, he is not absolutely
protected in the event the property is seized at the request of another
creditor who has priority over the sale proceeds. Therefore, the inferior
creditor has bargained for security knowing that he may be relegated
to having only the personal obligation of the debtor if the proceeds of
the sale are inadequate. Since the inferior creditor is in a position to
calculate the risk, he can pass the cost of that risk on to the other
contracting party. Because the inferior creditor knowingly accepts the
risk of injury and because his rights are subsidiary to the rights of
superior creditors, one may argue that Mennonite is not applicable.
However, in Mennonite, MBM was also an inferior creditor in
relation to the state's right to tax sale proceeds. The Court could easily
draw an analogy between MBM in the Indiana tax sale and the inferior
creditor in Louisiana executory process. The inferor creditor, under a
strict reading of Mennonite, because he has a property interest at stake
which may be adversely affected, is not required to take steps to safe-
guard his interests and is entitled to notice by mail if his address is
reasonably ascertainable.
If one cannot distinguish executory process on the basis of the
speculative nature of the deprivation, one may argue that executory
83. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2338.
84. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 803, 103 S. Ct. at 2714 (O'Connor, J., dissenting),
quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 70 S. Ct. at 657, (quoting American Land Co. v.
Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 67, 31 S. Ct. 200, 207 (1911)).
85. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317, 70 S. Ct. at 659.
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process may not be subject to Mennonite because the seizing parties are
different: the state in Mennonite and a private entity in executory process.
Perhaps, the Court did not intend to place the stringent burden of
providing Mullane notice to any interested party on private entities.
Mennonite was a tax case, and the Court imposed its notice burden on
the state, not on seizing parties generally. Although, the Court states
its holding broadly, when it refers to a party's ability to safeguard its
interests, it speaks of the state's constitutional obligation.16
A consideration of the particular interests of the seizing party, the
burden on that party to provide mailed notice, and the effect of that
burden on the business community and property sales in general would
be warranted under the dissent's balancing approach. In Mullane, the
Court considered the burden imposed on the trust plan and the effect
on its advantages to the beneficiaries if the trustees were forced to
investigate conjectural or future claims.8 7 Similarly, one should consider
the effect of requiring seizing creditors to investigate the conjectural
claims of all inferior creditors. Moreover, the efficacy of executory
process would be destroyed by a strict application of Mennonite. The
burden imposed on the seizing creditor would be expensive, and the costs
would be transferred to the consumer. In Mullane, costs were a factor
considered in the balancing of interests.8"
Arguably, Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3886 remedies any due proc-
ess deficiency in Louisiana's executory process even though Mennonite
does not allow a balancing analysis. The statute provides that any person
desiring notification of the seizure of an immovable may request such
notification by filing the request in the mortgage records of the parish
where the immovable is located. A ten-dollar fee to defer expenses is
charged. One may argue that this statute, in addition to the state imposed
limitations on the rights of inferior creditors, clearly indicates that the
only notice which is due the inferior creditor is constructive notice or
more certain notice duly requested and purchased. The statute goes even
further, stipulating that the sheriff's failure to notify under the statute
will not invalidate the sale. This notice to the inferior creditor is strictly
a privilege and not a matter of right. Under the entitlement theory one
would argue that the state has defined the inferior creditors rights so
as to not include notice by mail.
EXECUTORY PROCESS AND TRANSFEREES
On the other hand, Mennonite's application to Louisiana executory
process as it affects transferees, on first blush, seems clear. The transferee
86. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 799, 103 S. Ct. at 2712.
87. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317-18, 70 S. Ct. at 659.
88. Id.
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will be adversely affected by the proceeding because it will divest him
of ownership of property. In Louisiana, transferees of property later
subjected to executory process by the transferor's creditors receive no
personal notice before executory proceedings begin or before execution
of the sale. Article 2701 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
dispenses with notice to third-party transferees by statutorily implying
a pact de non alienando.9 The effect is that the holder of a mortgage
or privilege can disregard any alienations and proceed directly against
his debtor, even without a non-alienation clause in the mortgage act
and without need of a hypothecary action.9° A hypothecary action re-
quires notice to the present owner,9' while article 2701 does not.
Because the third-party possessor is not a party to the proceeding,
he is not afforded notice. 92 In Bonner v. B-W Utilities, a federal district
court sustained article 2701 against a facial constitutional challenge93 but
required that a third party must receive notice of the proceedings prior
to the execution of the sale, though he need not be named a party or
served personally with a writ of seizure. 94 Although Louisiana procedure
"provides third possessors with opportunity for hearing prior to judicial
sale of their property," the court in Bonner concluded that due process
requires that they receive notice of the proceedings before the sale so
that they may assert the statutory defenses. 95 The court recognized that
the third possessor's interest is in jeopardy, and therefore, he is due
"some form of notice of the judicial proceedings . . . in addition to
general publication.' '96
Although the third possessor's claim is subject to the rights of the
creditor, 97 he does have an ownership and possessory interest in the
property, which seems to invoke the rule of Mennonite. Also, Bonner
quotes Mullane in saying that any deprivation must be preceded by
notice and an opportunity to be heard. 9 Requiring notice to third
possessors seems only fair when one considers that the constitutionality
of Louisiana's executory process procedure is partly based on a con-
tractual confession of judgment which waives the mortgagor's right to
89. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2701 comment a.
90. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 2701 comment a, 3741; La. Civ. Code art. 3397; see
Bonner, 452 F. Supp. at 1300.
91. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3742.
92. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2701.
93. Bonner, 452 F. Supp. at 1303.
94. Id. at 1302-03.
95. Id. at 1301.
96. Id. at 1302.
97. A mortgage may be enforced against property "without reference to any sale or
alienation to the third person." La. Code Civ. P. art. 2701.
98. Bonner, 452 F. Supp. at 1300-01.
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an adversary hearing. 99 The third possessor is not a party to this contract,
and therefore, has not waived his due process rights. He has not know-
ingly accepted the risk of losing the property, as have inferior creditors.
Furthermore, Louisiana procedure allows the transferee an opportunity
to protect his interests by paying the balance, arresting the seizure, or
intervening to claim the enhanced value, if any, of the property."a° The
state has defined the third possessor's rights and afforded him an op-
portunity to assert defenses, but has provided him only with constructive
notice of the proceedings in which the defenses may be asserted. There-
fore, Bonner is correct in stating that some form of notice other than
publication is required.
Despite the protection afforded third possessors, Bonner provides a
more lenient standard for determining when Mullane notice is warranted
than does Mennonite. Bonner requires Mullane notice when the third
possessor's name and address are known to the seizing creditor. Men-
nonite, on the other hand, requires Mullane notice even if the interested
party is not known, but is reasonably identifiable. A transferee identified
in the public records is considered reasonably identifiable. Therefore,
some investigation is required under Mennonite, though not under Bon-
ner. The question remains whether the Mennonite or the Bonner test
for determining when that notice is required will apply. One distinction
which justifies the less stringent standard of Bonner in executory pro-
ceedings may be that Mennonite involves a tax sale in which the seizing
party is the government, while Bonner involves executory proceedings
instituted by a private entity.
The mortgagor-debtor and the third possesor owe the private mort-
gagee or privilege holder certain statutory obligations that are not owed
to the state by a mortgagee of property sold in a tax sale. A mortgagor
is bound, either contractually or statutorily, not to alienate the mortgaged
property to the prejudice of the mortgagee.10 ' Moreover, once the mort-
gage is recorded, subsequent possessors are deemed to have notice of
the mortgage and take the property subject to the encumbrance. 02 Just
as a creditor in Mennonite may rely on the public records to determine
ascertainability, a mortgagee should be allowed to rely on the recordation
of his mortgage as notice to third parties of his superior claim. These
statutorily imposed obligations are sufficient justification for the less
stringent notice requirement in Bonner. In tax sales, the mortgagee is
not required to take notice of the state's action in collecting taxes or
99. See Buckner v. Cormack, 272 So. 2d 326 (La. 1973), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S.
901, 94 S. Ct. 2594 (1974).
100. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2703.
101. Either a contractual pact de non alienando will exist, or more probably, La.
Code Civ. P. art. 2701 will create an implied pact de non alienando.
102. La. Civ. Code arts. 517, 3397(2), 3282.
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to pay the taxes himself. Accordingly, the entire burden has been placed
on the state. This is not the case in executory proceedings.
In executory process proceedings, the mortgagee arguably may rely
on the public records doctrine, thereby exempting him from the Men-
nonite due diligence standard. If a debtor may rely on his being listed
in the public records to attack a proceeding of which he received only
constructive notice, then a creditor should be allowed to invoke the
protections of the public records, if his mortgage or privilege is recorded,
to argue that- he need not investigate the existence or whereabouts of
a transferee not known by him to exist. After all, his claim existed
prior to the transferee's and the transferee is deemed to know of that
claim. In Mennonite, MBM was not deemed to know of the state's
claim, and that claim was subsequent to MBM's.
In practice, one would expect that a third possessor could more
easily reduce risk of loss to a mortgagee than a mortgagee could reduce
his risk of loss in a pending tax sale. Not only is a mortgage a matter
of record, but often a lawyer is involved in a transaction involving the
transfer of an immovable. The lawyer can apprise the purchaser of any
problems with the title which he seeks to acquire and take action to
protect the purchaser's interests. One title check would safeguard the
purchaser's interests. The mortgagee, to protect himself against tax sales
of property on which he holds a mortgage, must constantly check the
publications of every parish where he holds a mortgage on property or
constantly monitor his mortgagors for verification that taxes have been
paid. Therefore, a third possessor burdened only with a one-time task
of checking his title, assisted by counsel, and possibly holding title
insurance, should not be afforded the same notice as a mortgagee in a
tax sale.
All of the above arguments are based on the Mennonite premise
that due process requires some notice other than publication. Bonner
and Mennonite both purport to rely on Mullane, which explicitly main-
tained that notice by mail need not be afforded those who "although
they could be discovered upon investigation, do not in due course of
business come to knowledge ... .. "103 This premise is another example
of the departure from Mullane's balancing analysis which considers
business practices which affect the expectations of the parties and of
how that departure, if strictly followed, could have serious implications
beyond tax sales and upon persons other than mortgagees. Though the
Bonner rule is not as stringent as that of Mennonite, Bonner also
departed from the traditional notion of the protection of property rights
and departed from the balancing analysis. If Bonner would have used
Mullane's balancing approach, it probably would have considered the
103. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317, 70 S. Ct. at 659.
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factors discussed above and determined that mailed notice is not war-
ranted in light of article 2701's limitations on the rights of third possessors
and our laws of registry and mortgage.1°4
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS AND MORTGAGEES
The writ of fieri facias is used in the execution of judgments.
Louisiana procedure provides that upon the request of a money-judgment
creditor, a writ of fieri facias is issued directing seizure and sale of
property of the judgment debtor. 05 By the act of seizure, the seizing
creditor obtains a privilege over ordinary creditors of the judgment
debtor. 1°0 After seizure, the judgment debtor receives notice of the seizure
and a list of the property seized. 0 7 No other party is afforded notice
of the seizure. Although the debtor receives no prior notice of the
seizure, he does receive notice of the judgment shortly after it is ren-
dered. 08
When a debtor receives notice of a money judgment, he is aware
only of the creditor's right to seize and sell his property to satisfy the
judgment; he is not aware of what property will actually be seized. In
light of this fact, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal, in
Gauthreaux v. Gauthreaux, held that notice of seizure is required in
execution of money judgments because a money judgment gives no
notice that any property will actually be sold.' °9 The court held that
the notice given upon perfection of seizure and the three day waiting
period before advertising property for sale is adequate. 0 The implication
is that because the debtor knows of the judgment and the creditor's
right to seize, the debtor need receive no prior notice of the seizure.
However, notice upon seizure, listing the property seized and giving
notice of the pending sale,"' is required because the debtor is not sure
what property the creditor will opt to seize. This notice, according to
the court, serves to give the debtor an opportunity to pay the debt or
complain of irregularities." 2 Similarly, an earlier court stated that the
purpose of the notice given upon seizure was to apprise the debtor of
what property was taken in execution." 3 However, prior notice of the
judgment is not a valid justification for failure to notify mortgagees
104. La. Civ. Code arts. 3342-3370.
105. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 2253, 2291.
106. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2292.
107. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2293.
108. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1913.
109. 377 So. 2d 567, 570 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
110. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2331.
Ill. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2293.
112. 377 So. 2d at 570.
113. McDonogh V. Garland, 7 La. Ann. 143 (1852).
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with an interest in the debtor's property. Mortgagees, unlike judgment
debtors, are unaware of the judgment until recordation and, therefore,
are not warned in advance of possible seizure.
The sale under an execution of judgment has the same effect as
the sale in executory process. Superior creditors are protected and inferior
creditors are relegated to any surplus remaining after the costs of the
sale and the seizing creditor's claim are satisfied." 4 The inferior creditors,
as in executory process, may be adversely affected. The arguments
discussed above regarding the inapplicability of Mennonite due to the
speculative nature of the claim apply here."' However, unlike executory
process, the expectations of the parties do not seem as relevant. In
executory process, the inferior creditor takes the risk of foreclosure by
a prior mortgagee or other privilege holder. He is aware of the risk
and protects himself by charging a higher interest rate. However, money
judgments may be generated from sources such as tort or contract claims,
unknown to the inferior creditor. Therefore, under a balancing approach,
it is difficult to argue that the inferior creditor understood the risk
involved and implicitly agreed to be relegated to constructive notice.
The inferior creditor is in a situation similar to that of MBM in
Mennonite. In both instances, the effect of the sale is the loss of a
privilege over property, leaving only one recourse to protect one's in-
terest. MBM would have to pay the costs of redeeming the property
while inferior creditors in executions of judgments must pay the judgment
debt with interests and costs." 6 In many instances the price may be too
high to warrant any action to protect the privilege over the property.
One distinction between MBM and the inferior creditor is that MBM
could regain its interest even after the tax sale, whereas the inferior
creditor must pay the judgment before the sale. In light of this dis-
tinction, notice of the pending sale seems even more crucial to the
inferior creditor in executory proceedings. Nevertheless, execution of
judgments under a writ of fieri facias is an accepted procedure with a
long history. One may argue that the legislature considered the state
interest in the orderly, efficient, and speedy execution of its judgments
more important than the interests of ordinary creditors in their debtor's
property. Otherwise, judgments would always be subject to attack and
thus have very little practical value. Furthermore, the state provides for
means by which a creditor may secure his loan, and if he chooses not
to do so, then one could argue that he must accept a position inferior
to that of the seizing creditor and the state. The Mennonite rule regarding
the need to safeguard one's interests fails if the means are specifically
114. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 2372-2373.
115. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
116. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2340.
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defined by the state. If the law requires that one must take steps to
secure his interest, it is because the interest involved is not otherwise
considered protected under state law. As indicated before,' 7 property
interests only exist to the extent they are defined by the state. Therefore,
in Mennonite, MBM's privilege was protected, but only to the extent
it was not pre-empted by the state's right to seize the property for
payment of taxes.
By adopting a strict notice rule and rejecting Mullane's balancing
analysis, the Supreme Court has placed our system of executing judg-
ments in jeopardy. The effects of the holding in Mennonite extend
beyond mere upset to business expectations of secured creditors con-
cerning executory process; they threaten the very validity of judgments.
In Mullane, the Court considered the effect that its ruling would have
on the trust plan involved." 8 Likewise, today's courts should consider
the effect of the rigid due process rule of Mennonite on our judicial
system.
Louisiana procedure also makes no provision for the mailing of
notice prior to a judicial sale to transferees of judgment debtors. How-
ever, our law of registry defines clearly the rights of the parties. For
example, a transferee acquiring between the rendition and recordation
of a judgment cannot be affected by that judgment if he records his
conveyance. No seizure can occur after the sale is recorded." 9 The
judgment creditor is relegated to a direct action to nullify the sale as
a simulation. 20 Therefore, the transferee in a duly recorded act of sale
cannot be adversely affected because a seizure cannot take place.
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT AND TRANSFEREES
Conversely, if a judgment has been recorded and the property sub-
sequently transferred, our public records doctrine would hold that trans-
feree to knowledge of the judgment creditor's claim. Upon recordation
of the judgment, a judicial mortgage exists over all of the debtor's
immovables in the parish of recordation. 2' The mortgage follows the
property into the hands of the transferee and, because the judgment
creditor has a real right over the property of the transferee (of which
the transferee is deemed to be aware), the property is subject to seizure.
But, should the transferee, like the judgment debtor, be notified upon
seizure under article 2293 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure?
Even if he knows of the judgment, the transferee does not know that
117. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
118. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318, 70 S. Ct. at 659.
119. Keller v. Blanchard, 19 La. Ann. 53 (1867).
120. Id. at 54.
121. La. Civ. Code arts. 3322, 3328, 3336, 3346, 3347.
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the creditor will initiate proceedings to seize the property which he is
purchasing because the judgment is against all of the debtor's property
in the parish. 22 A Mennonite analysis would lead to the conclusion that
the transferee's property interest is adversely affected and notice by mail
is required.
However, again we have a situation in which the property interests
defined by the state are limited or subject to the judgment creditor's
rights. Because the judgment creditor has a valid judgment against the
debtor and has a right to execute on the judgment, it is reasonable for
the state to give his right priority over that of the transferee who had
notice of the judgment. The law of registry justifies the superiority of
the judgment creditor's rights. The state's rights are limited by the law
of registry in that no seizure can take place before recordation of the
judgment or after recordation of the sale of the judgment debtor's
property. Similarly, the transferee should be subject to the law of registry
and relegated to a position inferior to that of the judgment creditor if
the judgment was recorded. Furthermore, the adjudication of the cred-
itor's claim is final. 123
In Matthews v. Eldridge, 24 the United States Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the risk of an erroneous deprivation is a consideration in
the balancing of rights in a due process analysis, as is the probable
value of additional procedural safeguards. 25 If the claim has been ad-
judicated and a judgment rendered, there is little chance that the judg-
ment creditor's claim is invalid and that a transferee will be any better
off if the mailing of notice is afforded. 2 6 In either case, the judgment
creditor has a real right over the property, and the reasoning in Matthews
would seem to suggest that the mailing of notice is not required.
CONCLUSION
The Court in Mennonite applied a due process protection to a
property interest that had not previously been protected and required
that such protection be afforded to any party who will be adversely
affected by a proceeding. Being adversely affected does not necessarily
mean that one has been deprived of a property right traditionally rec-
ognized as warranting due process protection. Therefore, Mennonite has
"opened up a can of worms" and subjected many proceedings to due
process attacks because not every party who will be adversely affected
is provided with Mullane notice. Now, tax sales are open to attack from
122. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2291 comment b.
123. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2252.
124. 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976).
125. Id. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903.
126. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2298.
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spouses who are co-owners in community property, mineral owners,
lessees, heirs, and others.
Not only did Mennonite open the door for expansion of the cat-
egories of interests and parties afforded protection, it also left unan-
swered questions regarding the rights of mortgagees in proceedings other
than tax sales. Mennonite could be applied in proceedings such as
executory process and execution of judgments. In these proceedings,
government seizures and judicial sales are executed in accordance with
specific rules regarding notification and priority of claims. The common
purpose is efficient enforcement of contractual rights secured by liens
or privileges on property and judgments in light of the rights of the
parties as set by law. Over the years, people with property interests
developed expectations and business practices based on the fact that
their interests were protected. Mennonite ignored these expectations and
practices, and placed a burden on the state (and by analogy, on private
entities) to provide notice that previously was neither expected by the
interested party nor required by due process.
In considering Louisiana procedure in light of Mennonite, one can
see that the failure to provide notice by mail to "any interested party"
is well justified in each situation, based on acceptable considerations
under the pre-Mennonite analysis. A broad reading of Mennonite would
cause an upheaval of many procedures which have satisfied due process
under a balancing approach, by requiring Mullane notice to any party
adversely affected. This requirement would place an unprecedented bur-
den on the state and private creditors and would create much uncertainty
as to whom is to receive notice and how much effort must be exerted
to discover the identity of interested parties. The burden is not justified
when one considers that in many cases in which the state has not
traditionally provided protection, interested parties generally arrange for
protection themselves. The Court will be compelled, for practical reasons,
to limit Mennonite's holding to its facts or to create numerous exceptions
to its broad rule.
Before Mennonite, the courts reached an equitable result through a
balancing analysis. In the future, the Court should avoid adopting a
single inflexible rule regarding notice. Before the Court applies any test
at all, it should consider the property interest involved, the party's rights
as set by law, and whether this interest is traditionally accepted as falling
under due process protections. Finally, a balancing test should be applied.
Under such a test, the Court would consider the party's ability or
obligation to safeguard his rights, his expectations, accepted business
practices, and his rights in the property in relation to the rights of the
seizing party. The burden to be imposed on the state would be weighed
against the party's interest in the property. The Court would consider
the state's interest in the particular proceeding, the costs and time
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involved if additional burdens are imposed, and the effect on the ef-
ficiency of the proceeding itself.
It is obvious that the Mennonite rule cannot be fairly applied to
procedures where private parties with rights governed by state law are
involved. By limiting Mennonite as much as possible, the Court could
return to the traditional due process analysis instead of continually
revising and making exceptions to the rule. Because of its flexibility,
the traditional analysis provides for substantial fairness without unduly
burdening any party. Furthermore, the Court will avoid the need to
create a series of rules applicable to specific procedures and depending
on the particular interests involved. One may analogize the Mennonite
rule to that of Fuentes v. Shevin. 27 In Fuentes, the Court adopted a
general rule that notice must be given prior to the deprivation of
property. Two years later the Court was forced to modify that general
rule in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. 121 The Court realized that a procedure
may be fair for due process purposes though it does not necessarily
meet the requirements of Fuentes. Likewise, the current Supreme Court
may be forced to retreat from the stand taken in Mennonite. 29 In the
interest of fairness, flexibility, and the effective conduct of business,
the retreat is desirable.
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